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FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER*
Surprisingly, our panel discussion reveals that conflicts teachers can agree on
some basic propositions. If their use of religious metaphors is any indication, 1 even
interest analysts realize that their approach is a creed rather than a science. They also
acknowledge that interest analysis has "warts" 2 and "flaws, ' 3 and that in the
conflict of laws, as elsewhere, the results produced by legal rules and approaches do
matter.4 Thus, there is some common ground between us. But since the role in which
our chairman has cast me calls for a critique of Russ Weintraub's paper, I shall stress
the differences rather than the similarities of our points of view. Let me begin, then,
with a few critical remarks about the doctrine he espouses. 5
I
With three other members of this panel, I vote against the proposed resolution
which John Kozyris has drafted to guide our discourse. By now, all those who labor
in the field should appreciate the poignancy of Court Peterson's remark that "gov-
ernmental-interest analysis is not a theory but a religion, ' 6 an assessment already
foreshadowed by Hans Baade's more secular characterization of the approach's
followers as "True Believer[s]." 7 Like others, I feel unable to make the required leap
of faith. In my opinion, metaphysics, cults and catechisms are of little help in
adjudicating multistate disputes. Preoccupation with transcendental beliefs merely
distracts us from the real problems posed by the ever-increasing mobility of persons,
things, and transactions. Past history shows how earlier ideologies, such as the vested
rights and local law doctrines, have hindered rather than promoted progress, and the
confused state of current American conflicts law hardly inspires confidence in the
dogmas of our days. Already, the analysts have split into numerous sub-cults; in
Herma Hill Kay's words, that comer of the conflicts swamp is dotted by "stagnant
pools of doctrine, each jealously guarded by its adherents." 8 The common accord
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among Brainard Currie's disciples is largely acoustic, consisting of little more than
an identical terminology;9 the ritual incantation of the words "policies" and "inter-
est" in fact camouflages widely divergent views.
Interest analysis has lost cohesion and coherence. No longer a single doctrine,
it has become but a loose amalgamation of different approaches that furnish scant
guidance to judges faced with multistate problems. What agreement still persists is
largely limited to the disposition of "false conflicts," which is an elliptical way of
saying that the law of the parties' common home state applies. That may well be an
acceptable choice-of-law principle, but the analysts can hardly claim to have invented
it.
The Italian Civil Code of 186510 established a common home state rule for
contract choice of law, though in accordance with Mancini's teachings" the Italian
legislature proclaimed the lex patriae rather than the lex domicilii to be the relevant
personal law. Later, when the Wehrmacht occupied much of Europe, the Nazi
government issued a decree according to which German law was to govern actions
between Germans for torts committed outside of Germany.12 Thus, the common home
state rule is not a recent breakthrough, nor is it peculiar to interest analysis. At best,
Currie deserves credit for popularizing, under the label "false conflicts," the
common home state principle as part of the ostensible non-rule approach he advo-
cated. That modest accomplishment hardly justifies the extravagant claims of a
"Copemican revolution" 1 3 or a "renaissance"' 4 of American conflicts thinking. The
true test of the value of the modem doctrine is therefore its ability to cope with
situations in which the ready expedient of relying on a common nexus is unavailable.
But it is precisely at this point where the consensus of Currie's followers breaks down
and the "proponents of a functional or interest analysis begin to shout at one another
in earnest."' s
Whenever the parties to a lawsuit hail from different states, Currie's conceptual
framework produces "true conflicts" 16 and "unprovided-for cases."' 7 Conundrums
of this kind are neither novel nor peculiar to Currie's teachings.' 8 They are merely the
symptoms of a birth defect that afflicts any unilateralist approach, that is to say the
attempt to resolve multistate problems by focusing on the spatial reach of substantive
9. This is not to say that terminological problems do not exist. Thus Weintraub prefers to speak of "functional"
rather than "interest" analysis. Weintraub, supra note I, at 495. See also id. at 495 ("state interests" is
"probably a needlessly confusing term").
10. ComcE CwQviE, Disposizioni preliminari art. 9, para. I (capacity and form), para. 2 (essential validity and
effects).
11. See Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERcER L. REv. 419, 454-56 (1984). Whatever one might say about
Mancini, he was clearly not an interest analyst.
12. Verordnung fiber die Rechtsanwendung by Sch5digungen deutscher Staatsangeh6riger ausserhalb des Reichs-
gebiets of December 7, 1942, 1942 REicHsEsErszatArr, TEu. I. 706, § 1(1). See Morse, Choice of Law in Tort: A
Comparative Surey, 32 As,. J. CoMp. L. 51, 57-58 (1984). Other nations as well have adopted the common home state
rule. See id. at 91-93; see also 2 E. RABEL, TnE CoNaucr oF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 244-46 (2d ed. 1960).
13. Von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CoRNEL. L. REv. 927, 933 (1975).
14. Von Mehren, Book Review, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 91, 91 (1964).
15. R. CtwrroN, D. CuRsiE & H. KAY, CONFrLCT OF LAws 260 (3d ed. 1981).
16. See id. at 260-65.
17. See id. at 305-08.
18. But cf. id. at 303 (crediting Currie with having first identified the phenomenon of the "unprovided-for case").
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rules. 19 Long before similar "discoveries" were made in the United States, foreign
unilateralists wondered what should happen if more than one state "wishes" to
control a given transaction, or if no state makes such a claim.20 European authors
coined the terms "cumuls," to describe the overlap of multiple claims to legislative
jurisdiction, and "lacunes," to describe the legal gaps that result from the sublime
disinterest of states in a given transaction. 2' To solve the true-conflicts puzzle,
Antoine Pillet invented the notion of "minimum sacrifice,' '22 a precursor of Baxter's
"comparative-impairment" doctrine.23 These and other proposals to cope with true
conflicts and unprovided-for cases bring to mind Joseph Beale's characterization of
Pillet's theory as "ingenious, interesting and specious." '2 4
The unilateralists' unconvincing attempts to resolve the spurious problems of
their own making highlight the shortcomings of their method. Their desperate
strategems to escape from a logical impasse inspire little confidence. The blunt
forum-law preference Currie and others25 have advocated is too drastic an expedient
to please American judges.2 6 On the other hand, the comparative impairment doctrine
and similar efforts to multilateralize unilateralism are too fine-spun and implausible
to appeal to anybody but devoutly scholastic minds.
II
I am pleased to see that in coping with the unilateralist predicament Russ
Weintraub eschews both ethnocentricity and fanciful glass-bead games. Faced with
the clash of personal laws he, like other analysts, is compelled to look for a device
that would break the resulting stalemates, 27 for at this stage speculation about the
sovereign's interests in its subjects no longer helps. The analyst must, of necessity,
become eclectic, because the problem cannot be resolved within the frame of
reference of the very theory that created it in the first place. The approach Weintraub
recommends at this juncture is frankly antithetical to the basic tenets of interest
analysis as originally conceived: he seeks to articulate forum-neutral solutions
designed to effectuate transjurisdictional goals, to promote predictability and to do
substantial justice.28 These, of course, are objectives whose pursuit Currie had
19. See Juenger, supra note 11, at 426-27.
20. See Gothot, Le renouveau de la tendance unilatiraliste en droit international priv6, 60 REvuE CRmQUE DE DRorr
lNmmATioma PRivr 1, 29-31 (1971) (with further references).
21. See id. For critical comments, see 1 H. BATFOL & P. LAGARDE, D~arr 1NTrRNAToNA PRivi 297-98 (7th ed.
1981); P. MAYER, DRorr ImNERNAmoNAt. Pvi 98-99 (2d ed. 1983).
22. See Pillet, Thiorie continentale des conflits de lois, 2 REcurs. nms CotRs 447, 469-70, 482 (1924-1). Pillet's
Hague lecture is a brief summary of ideas he had published in various books and periodicals. For an English translation
of excerpts from earlier articles, see 3 J. BEA12, A TARsE oN THE Co.N ucr oF LAWS 1942-48 (1935).
23. See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STr. L. Rv. 1, 12-19 (1963).
24. 3 J. BEmx., supra note 22, at 1947.
25. Pillet conceded that his principle of minimum sacrifice could not work in all cases, and he also used the forum
preference as a tiebreaker of last resort. Pillet, supra note 22, at 471.
26. See Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERcEa L. RFv. 521, 551, 586 (1983).
27. See Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash, 34 MEcEaR L. REv. 645 (1983).
28. See Weintraub, supra note 1, at 493, 496.
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roundly condemned. 29 I, however, find Weintraub's teleological bent most congenial,
and we are in good company. David Cavers, 30 Paul Freund3' and Robert Leflar32 have
recognized the need for sound decisions in multistate cases. Moreover, looking at the
results, rather than the reasoning, of "revolutionary" conflicts decisions, one sus-
pects that this consideration is also uppermost in the judicial mind.33 If I am unable
to accept the rules Weintraub proposes, 34 I nonetheless welcome his result orienta-
tion.
On the other hand, I do not share Weintraub's belief in the innate superiority of
personal over territorial contacts. The personal law principle cannot be deduced from
sociology or from political science, as interest analysts seem to assume. If "sover-
eigns" (about whom are we talking? the governor, the legislature, the courts or the
people?) have any interest at all in private litigation, 35 one should expect them to be
concerned primarily with what is going on in their territories. In fact, Weintraub
acknowledges the importance of territoriality when he refers to "social consequences
.. experienced in a state." 36 But why should governments be interested merely in
consequences and not in the acts that cause them? Is it not idle, in any event, to ponder
the mind-set of anthropomorphized states? 37 Weintraub seems to recognize the
weakness of the assumption that it is possible to psychoanalyze states, for he plays
down the notion of sovereign concerns that permeates Currie's teachings. Instead of
using the "needlessly confusing" term "state interests," 38 he talks more vaguely
about policies that may be advanced or frustrated, depending on where the parties
live.39
But where do multinational enterprises "live"? Or gypsies? Or jet-setters? Do
these groups fall outside the protection of local laws? How can one assume that
legislatures legislate and courts decide for the benefit of local yokels only? Has law
become a personal possession? If that be the "mainstream of legal reasoning"4 of
our days, I shall be content to swim elsewhere. Until someone persuades me
otherwise, I am inclined to think that "every law has both a territorial and a personal
application.' ' n4 The United States Supreme Court seems to share that view. The
plurality opinion in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague42 draws no distinction between
29. See B. CURiM, SELEcrE ESSAYS ON THE CoNUcr OF LAWS 100-01, 104-06, 119, 153-54, 158-59, 168-71, 181,
581, 617, 699-701, 708-09 (1963).
30. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, 193 (1933). But see D. CAVERS,
THE CnoicE-or-LAw PRoc.ss 75-87 (1965).
31. See Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1214 (1946).
32. See R. LEFLAR, AMiRicAN CONFucts LAw 180-81 (3d ed. 1977).
33. See Juenger, supra note 5, at 47-48.
34. See Weintraub, supra note 1, at 507-08.
35. Contra Juenger, supra note 5, at 29-30 (with further references).
36. Weintraub, supra note 1, at 502 (emphasis added).
37. See B. CORRUE, supra note 29, at 89, 477, 489, 496, 592 ("selfish" and "altruistic'" states). But cf. D. CAvERs,
supra note 30, at 302 n.19.
38. Weintraub, supra note 1, at 495.
39. Id. at 495.
40. Id. at 493. Use of the herd instinct as a basis for legal argumentation reveals the intellectual poverty of
interest analysis.
41. 3 J. BEALE, supra note 22, at 1929.
42. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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personal and territorial links; any "significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts... with the parties and the occurrence or transaction" has apparently the
same potential for "creating state interests. ' '43
Too bad the lessons of history are rarely learned. The statutists' vain attempts to
classify laws as personal or real amply demonstrate the futility of metalegal specu-
lations about the personal and territorial scope of legal rules.44 These endeavors came
to naught because neither the letter nor the spirit of legal rules tells us when they
"wish" to be applied. Lest I be misunderstood, 45 let me emphasize that I do not favor
strict constructionism. On the contrary, I believe that in applying a rule it makes sense
to look at its spirit as well as its letter. But I do not believe that the personal or
territorial scope of a given rule of decision is revealed by its purpose. Judicial
opinions, certainly, inspire little hope in policy analysis as a means of adjudicating
multistate disputes. 46 Those who, like Currie, maintain that choice-of-law issues can
be resolved by divining the reach of legal rules through the "ordinary processes of
construction and interpretation" 47 have yet to refute Ernst Rabel's observation that
"the answer is not in them." 48
In any event, even if each rule of decision came equipped with an explicit
directive concerning its spatial purport, conflicts problems would persist. Since one
cannot reasonably expect all states to adopt identical directives, there will always be
overlaps and gaps, "true conflicts" and "unprovided-for cases." As I have noted in
Part I of my remarks, unilateralism offers no solution for these conundrums; interest
analysts must look outside their own system, and resort to such devices as a simple
forum law preference, multilateralism, or the better-law rule to resolve the conflicts
their approach creates. Forced to stray from their own methodology, they become
thorougly discomfitted, and here lies the true reason for their insistence on the
personal law principle: if territorial contacts were of equal weight with personal ones,
all conflicts would be true49 and policy analysis dispensable.
III
But what about Bob Sedler's argument that in the "real world" interest analysis
does work and generally will produce functionally sound and fair results?5 0 That is,
no doubt, correct. As Judge Evrigenis showed almost twenty years ago, American
unilateralism has the quality of "antimatter."5 It annihilates rules and replaces them
43. Id. at 308. See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532
(1935).
44. See D. CAvEm, supra note 30, at 2-3; Juenger, supra note 11, 428-29.
45. Compare Weintraub, supra note 1, at 494 with Juenger, supra note 5, at 33-35.
46. See Juenger, supra note 5, at 34-35.
47. See W. REESE & M. RosENHG, CoNLicr OF LAWS 477 (8th ed. 1984).
48. 1 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMtPARATIVE STuDY 103 (2d ed. 1958).
49. See Reppy, supra note 27, at 647 n.12.
50. Sedler, supra note I, at 483.
51. Evrigenis, Book Review, 18 REvuE HEuiMrQUE DE DRorr ITEm-A-. NAIL 471, 473 (1965) (referring to Ehr-
enzweig). It has been pointed out that that criticism describes Currie's approach more accurately than Ehrenzweig's. E.
ScoLEs & P. HAY, Co.;rucr OF LAs 16 n.4 (1982).
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with complex pretexts for applying the lexfori, the law that judges know best, can
apply best, and can adapt to the exigencies of a particular case. Moreover, application
of forum law usually guarantees fair results in tort cases, which constitute the large
majority of reported conflicts decisions. The homing trend of interest analysis allows
plaintiffs to shop for the most favorable law, and thereby to subvert whatever interests
governments may have in such noxious enactments as guest statutes, which capri-
ciously bar recovery, and wrongful death acts, which impose unreasonable limits on
damages. It might therefore make sense to adopt the rule that forum law applies in tort
cases except, perhaps, where the parties share a common domicile. Only a conflicts
expert, however, can conceivably explain why judges should probe the psyche of
domestic and foreign legislatures and engage in legal mathematics 52 instead of simply
applying choice-of-law rules of that kind.
Yet, even in the real world matters are apparently not all that easy. If interest
analysis works so well in practice, why should it be necessary to devote sixty-nine
pages plus an appendix to a summary of American case law?5 3 Why are judicial
conflicts opinions so long and full of footnotes; why do state supreme courts vacillate,
and why are bench and bar bewildered? If Currie's doctrine does indeed provide "a
rational basis for making choice of law decisions," 54 why do his followers disagree
among each other in principle and detail? As Lea Brilmayer points out, that doctrine
has come to mean all things to all people;55 interest analysis is but "a term employed
to describe perhaps a dozen different methods." 56 That is, of course, precisely why
it is so difficult to attack. As was to be expected, Brilmayer's attempt to take issue
with what she considers to be the foundation of that conglomeration of discordant
ideas has already exposed her to the charges that she has failed to address herself to
some idiosyncratic variation on Currie's theme, 57 that she misunderstood Currie58 and
that her arguments are misdirected because Currie himself did not know what he was
talking about.59
Outsiders may consider the disarray of current interest analysis, which these
counterattacks reveal, as a sure sign of failure. Currie's disciples, however, thrive on
factionalism. What an English critic wrote about the attractions of Marxism to British
intellectuals seems to fit, mutatis mutandis, Currie's dogma:
[Interest analysis] is a religion. Its adherents are unlikely to lose their millenarian faith
because of its practical or intellectual shortcomings. Even better, it is a religion divided
into sects so that these shortcomings can be blamed on other heretical groups and factions.
52. See Evrigenis, Tendances doctrinales actuelles en droit international privi, 118 Rcuan DEs Cours 313, 364-65
(1966-11).
53. See Kay, supra note 26.
54. Sedler, supra note 1, at 490.
55. Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 459,
(1985).
56. Reppy, supra note 27, at 647.
57. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 484-85.
58. See id. at 486.
59. See id. at 487-88.
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Is not this one attraction of [Currie's doctrine]? Not its end but its endless means. The
ceaseless... theorizing, squabbling, struggling, denouncing and demonstrating, ....
and the proclamation, abandonment and reproclamation of seminal analyses, approaches
and exegetics.
The fact that the end is unattainable is unimportant. It is the means which are attractive-
revving round and round on a highly-pitched ideological Honda. 60
Unfortunately, the antics of joyriding conflicts revolutionaries have done little to
improve the image of our discipline. The subject has been dropped from many bar
examinations, few conflicts articles are printed in the better journals, law schools have
reduced the hours allocated to a course that was once considered one of the most
stimulating in the entire curriculum and enrollment is dropping. Currie may have been
right after all in predicting that the "distinctive task of the conflict-of-laws
technician . . . is one of diminishing importance.' 61
Worse yet, the freewheeling non-rule approach of interest analysis has provoked
a backlash. Already, there are calls for a return to fundamentalism. 62 If such counsel
is heeded, the American conflicts upheaval has been entirely in vain. Its true
accomplishments, notably the improved protection of interstate accident victims, 6 3
would be sacrificed to the elusive goal of "conflicts justice.' '64 The yearning for
clarity and coherence, virtues interest analysis cannot offer, is understandable. But it
would be deplorable if American conflicts law, rebounding from one orthodoxy to
another, were to regress to "the sinkhole it once occupied. "65 Preoccupied with the
chaotic state of current doctrine, those who favor the conventional wisdom of yore
tend to overlook that the doctrinal foundations of the "classical" system are no less
shaky than the ones on which Currie's edifice rests. Friedrich Carl Savigny, it will be
recalled, hypothesized a "seat" of legal relationships 66 and Beale believed to have
solved the conflicts puzzle by reducing it to the enforcement of vested rights. 67 But
rights never vest without a choice-of-law rule that makes them vest, and those legal
relationships that cause conflicts problems have no single seat; they straddle state
boundaries.
Quite apart from their question-begging nature, 68 the old doctrines did not work
well at all as applied in practice. Inevitably, the traditional choice-of-law rules
mechanism imported substandard foreign rules of decision that offended the forum's
sense of justice, and judicial discontent with the unfair results they produced explains
the success of the conflicts revolution in American courts. How, for instance, can one
expect California judges to apply a foreign guest act after the supreme court of that
60. Anderson, Fellow Travellers Who Never Arrive, The Times (London), Jan. 2, 1985, at 10, col. 6.
61. B. CutR , supra note 29, at 592.
62. See, e.g., Davies, A Legislator's Look at Hague and Choice of Law, 10 HotsrRA L. REv. 171, 192-93 (1981)
(resuscitating Savigny's seat dogma); Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 Wu. & MARY
L. REv. 173, 214 (1981) (favoring Bealean rules).
63. See Juenger, supra note 5, at 47, 48.
64. See Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and the American Reformers, 27
A',. J. Co.tp. L. 615, 632 (1979); Korm, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. Rev. 772, 959 (1983).
65. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAw & Co-mnm. PRoDs. 10, 26 (spring 1977).
66. See Juenger, supra note 11, at 450-51.
67. See 3 J. BEAuE, supra note 22, at 1968-69, 1974.
68. See I A. Eusrez'rno, PIVATE ITrMNAONAL LAw 55 n.56 (1967).
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state held the local version unconstitutional? 69 Whereas the forum bias of interest
analysis checks the influx of odious foreign laws, the classical method can assure
quality control only by recourse to evasionary tactics. To avoid injustice, during the
First Restatement era courts invoked characterization and public policy, 70 escape
devices that impugn the system's credibility and undercut its claim to forum-proof
neutrality. But in spite of these deficiencies, judges may prefer the comfort of fixed
rules to the discomfiture they experience when asked to apply non-rule approaches.
As the New York experience shows, courts may become sufficiently disenchanted
with free form analyses to revert, in desperation, to mechanical jurisprudence.7t
IV
We now seem to face a dilemma: should we reintroduce hard and fast rules that
work injustice and encourage evasion, or should we retain non-rule approaches that
serve as a thinly disguised pretext for applying forum law? These are unpleasant
alternatives. If there is truly no other choice, eight centuries of efforts by some of the
finest legal minds have been wasted. As a Louisiana judge observed more than a
century and a half ago, if "so many.., men, of great talents and learning,
are... found to fail in fixing certain principles, we are forced to conclude that they
have failed, not from want of ability, but because the matter was not susceptible of
being settled on certain principles.' '72 Should we, then, indulge in resignation, or
could it be that something has gone wrong in the law of conflicts?
In my opinion, many of the problems that bedevil our discipline are rooted in our
fascination with theories that blind us to realities. These theories, in turn, often rest
on dubious assumptions. For instance, both interest analysts and rulists start from the
proposition that it is the sole purpose of the conflict of laws to determine which state's
law controls. Neither of the two opposing camps questions whether it makes sense to
rely exclusively on domestic rules of decision to govern transactions that are interstate
and international in nature, and whether all of such rules are equally fit for the
purpose. These propositions, however, have never been free from doubt. It is hardly
an accident that Joseph Story, the greatest American conflicts jurist, wrote the opinion
in Swift v. Tyson, 73 which stressed the need for a universal mercantile law. Similarly,
Judge Weinstein's opinion in the spectacular Agent Orange litigation74 hypothesized
the existence of a national consensus law to resolve problems for which neither the
First Conflicts Restatement nor interest analysis holds forth the promise of a satis-
factory solution. Other reported opinions as well evince a distinct uneasiness about the
wisdom of applying local law to multistate realities. 75
69. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
70. See Weintraub, supra note 1, at 497.
71. See Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914,405 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1978); Towley v. King
Arthur Rings, 40 N.Y.2d 129, 351 N.E.2d 728, 386 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1976). But cf. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 65
N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
72. Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569, 595-96 (La. 1827).
73. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
74. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
75. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1327 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Air Crash
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In contrast to judges, who must decide real-life disputes, theoreticians all too
often forget that the conflict of laws raises fundamental questions about interstate and
international justice. Thus, taking issue with the suggestion that choice-of-law issues
may be resolved "in favor of the advancement or promotion of multistate activity,' '76
the authors of a conflicts casebook question the "dubious assumption that such
activity is by and large a good thing."77 Their comment suggests that some acade-
micians countenance a conflict of laws system which would actively discourage
transactions that cross state lines. Wrapped up in theoretical speculations, these
writers are oblivious to the very purpose of the field of conflict of laws, although it
has been reiterated many times in a rich literature ranging from Joseph Story78 to the
Second Restatement, 79 and they forget that the United States is, after all, a "common
market." °80 Once theorizing reaches that level, it is not surprising that scholars are
prone to losing sight of what is involved in conflicts cases. Story knew that they dealt
with the "common business of private persons," 81 and if reported opinions are any
indication, sovereign rights are indeed rarely at stake. Rather, choice-of-law problems
are engendered by such mundane occurrences as traffic accidents, exploding boilers,
spousal kidnapping, breached contracts, and purloined cars. At issue are the rights of
accident victims, children, consumers, manufacturers, insurers, and banks. Should we
not ask how courts dealing with such multistate matters can best achieve the objective
of reaching fair results?
It has been suggested that the conflict of laws is simply not up to this task.
According to Arthur von Mehren, "one who expects to achieve results in multistate
cases that are as satisfying in terms of standards of justice and of party acceptability
as those reached in purely domestic cases is doomed to disappointment.' '82 This is a
startling admission. Surely, practitioners are entitled to expect more from conflicts
teachers than the mere flexing of "jurisprudential muscles." 83 At the very least,
scholars should ponder whether it may somehow be possible to "better the human
condition through law." ' 84 I am heartened to see that Weintraub, for one, has not
succumbed to facile pessimism. The alternative reference rules he has drafted 85 are
designed to yield acceptable outcomes in multistate products cases, 86 and with this
objective I fully agree. I am also pleased to note that unlike those interest analysts who
manage to complicate the simplest matters, he has labored hard to draft manageable
Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 632-33 (7thCir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Tooker v. Lopez, 24N.Y.2d
569, 591-92, 249 N.E.2d 394, 408, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 538-39 (1969) (Burke, J., concurring).
76. A. voN MEHR.N & D. TRtrAusAN, THE LAw oF MULTISTATE PROBI. is 407 (1965).
77. R. CPAgrroN, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 15, at 375.
78. See J. SoRY, CO MENTARIES ON THE CoNFucr OF LAws 7-9, 39. 320 (2d ed. 1841).
79. RET'mmTENT (SEcoN) OF CoNFucr or LAwS § 6(2)(a) and comment d on § 6(2) (1971) [hereinafter cited as SECOND
RESTATEMENr.
80. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) (White, J.).
81. J. STORY, supra note 78, at 12.
82. Von Mehren, Choice of Lanr and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAw & Co.vrNIP. PRoas. 27, 42 (Spring 1977).
83. Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 641, 644 (1968).
84. Id.
85. Weintraub, supra note 1, at 508.
86. See id. at 504.
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rules to govern more complex situations. Still, I cannot endorse his proposed
choice-of-law provisions.
V
Regrettably, Weintraub's proposal is marred by design defects. First of all, he
picked the wrong blueprint. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Products Liability, 87 which served him as a source of inspiration,8 8 has little to
commend itself as a model. That convention has attracted few ratifications. It was
elaborated by conflicts experts most of whom were steeped in the fundamentalist
tradition8 9 and hailed from countries whose products liability law is underdeveloped
in comparison to ours. 90 Obviously, an American choice-of-law rule should go
beyond such a reluctant compromise9' negotiated with representatives from nations
that lacked the practical experience in both the substantive and the conflicts aspects
of products liability litigation, an experience that seems indispensable for an informed
judgment about how to deal with multistate cases.
Weintraub, of course, realizes that the convention as it stands hardly deserves
emulation, and he has attempted to improve on the original. A feature he likes is the
plaintiff's option to select the applicable law, because "widely shared developments"
call for a "plaintiff-favoring rule.' 92 Indeed, abroad as well as in the United States
there is considerable concern about the protection of consumers against the risks that
mass-produced goods inevitably create. 93 The resulting trend to expand private
remedies may well justify a conflicts rule favoring injured parties. Yet Weintraub
goes on to say:
If such a rule is to be fair to the defendant, it must choose plaintiff-favoring law only if
the law's compensation policy will be advanced by recovery and if the jurisdiction with
that rule has sufficient nexus with defendant or defendant's course of conduct to make the
use of its law reasonable. 94
This passage is heavy going. Apparently, it seeks to accommodate two rather
different considerations: (1) the "wishes" of sovereigns concerning the scope of their
laws, 95 and (2) the asserted need to protect the "reasonable expectations of the
defendant.' '96
Both of these considerations are open to challenge. The first has an aura of
unreality given the fact that products liability law, at least in the United States, is
largely judgemade. Whom, then, should one ask about the sovereign's wishes?
87. Il Acts and Documents of the 12th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (1972),
reprinted in 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 150 (1973).
88. See Weintraub, supra note 1, at 504.
89. Cf. Cavers, The Proper Law of Producer's Liability, 26 Ihr'L & CoM. L.Q. 703, 723, 724 (1977).
90. See Voskuil, Preface, in H. Duairr TEaBms, INTEMRATIONAL PRODucr Ltnaumn- (1979).
91. See Cavers, supra note 89, at 724, 725.
92. Weintraub, supra note 1, at 504.
93. See H. Dutrrim TEBEs, supra note 90, at 119.
94. Weintraub, supra note 1, at 504.
95. Id. at 506.
96. Id. at 505.
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Presumably the very court that laid down the pertinent rule of decision with obvious
disregard for its spatial purport. When the conflicts issue arises later, that court would
have to divine what it had in mind at a time when it gave no thought at all to the
problem. The second consideration rubs with Weintraub's rejection of the deterrence
argument, 97 for enterprises that manufacture and sell products without regard to
liability can hardly claim reliance when it is imposed. And what are the expectations
of those who pollute the stream of commerce with defective products? Even foreign
entrepreneurs, less accustomed as they are than ours to being held accountable for
defective wares, must realize-if they read the newspapers-that they may become
defendants in an American lawsuit in the event that their products cause injuries here.
Should they not insure themselves accordingly, unless they are able somehow to keep
the merchandise out of the United States altogether? In short, the requirement of
"availability through commercial channels" 98 seems ill-advised. There is no com-
pelling reason to leave unsuspecting consumers without a remedy simply because the
noxious product should not have been where it was. 99
Inevitably, Weintraub's mixture of two debatable objectives, the apples of
private reliance interests and the oranges of governmental interests, produces a set of
rules that are open to challenge on several grounds. First of all, the mechanism of
selecting the applicable law is deficient, for it seems wrong on principle to let one
litigant dictate the law to the other. That expedient implies an abdication of the
judge's role and smacks of favoritism. The only justification for giving a private party
such an extraordinary power is the need to accord consumers more ample protection,
and this consideration explains the pertinent provision of the Hague Convention. lOO
In permitting manufacturers and sellers to choose a less favorable law prevailing at
the plaintiffs residence, proposed rule (B) of Weintraub's draft'01 turns this idea on
its head. In effect, that rule confers an unwarranted choice-of-law privilege, which
enables enterprises to export with impunity shoddy merchandise that would expose
them to certain liability if it were distributed at their principal place of business. If
reliance interests matter at all, the law should protect a foreign victim who may have
bought or used a dangerous product in the belief that it is safe because it has been
manufactured in a place where stringent liability standards prevail. Moreover, it
appears unsatisfactory, if not discriminatory, to apply to different parties dramatically
different standards of recovery for the same loss in mass disaster cases like In re Paris
Air Crash of March 3, 1974102 and the Agent Orange suit.10 3 Finally, it makes but
little sense to offer plaintiffs a wider choice of punitive damages, as proposed rule (C)
97. Id. at 506-07.
98. Id. at 508.
99. Even a products liability choice-of-law rule that omits the commercial availability requirement affords
defendants a certain measure of protection against surprises. The lower the probability that products will turn up in
unexpected places, the less likely it is that a manufacturer or distributor will be liable for accidents caused there. On the
other hand, the more nimble a product happens to be, the more reasonable it is to require sellers to insure themselves
adequately against the possibility that a particularly stringent law will be applied.
100. See Cavers, supra note 89, at 723 (quoting Reese).
101. Weintraub, supra note 1, at 508.
102. 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
103. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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does, t° 4 than that available for purposes of actual compensation. In general, a
plaintiff-favoring choice-of-law rule may be acceptable because of the current trend
to disregard those rules of decision that unreasonably curtail recovery. But there is no
similar consensus on whether victims should be entitled to awards in excess of their
actual damages.
Something, it seems, went wrong in drafting the proposed rules. Their defects
reveal the pitfalls of an approach that relies on private initiative to vindicate
governmental concerns. As is apparent from Weintraub's proposal, we would be
better off without a conflicts dogma that attempts to defer to the wishes of sovereigns.
If we left Leviathan to watch out for his own interests, and stopped worrying about
the relative superiority of personal and territorial contacts,1 0 5 we might find it easier
to devise draft rules that promote interstate justice through the familiar choice-of-law
mechanism. Drafting on a clean slate, we would be constrained only by pragmatic
considerations and the limits of our legal imagination. Actually, not much original
thinking is required if one keeps an open mind, for there are sources of inspiration
close at hand. Why bother with the Hague Convention, if there are home-grown
models, such as the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws and the Uniform
Commercial Code, that can be profitably canvassed for solutions? While my role as
a participant in this symposium is that of a critic, it may be appropriate to add a
constructive note by trying my hand at drafting an alternative to Weintraub's
proposal.
VI
Section 145 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws lists various contacts
to be taken into account in deciding tort choice-of-law cases. The second sentence of
section 1-105(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code suggests that practically any
personal and territorial link is a sufficiently strong connecting factor, since an
"appropriate relation" 10 6 will do to justify the application of Code provisions to a
multistate transaction. Whatever doubts may once have existed about the propriety of
such an expansive claim to extraterritoriality have since been laid to rest by the United
States Supreme Court. 107 It seems fair to assume that those minimum contacts that
justify the application of the lexfori likewise warrant the application of foreign law,
though interest analysts steeped in the Curriesque tradition may disagree. Accord-
104. Weintraub, supra note 1, at 508.
105. The disadvantages of relying exclusively on personal connecting factors are equally apparent from Weintraub's
proposed rule on contract choice of law. See Weintraub, supra note 1, at 498. That rule fails to incorporate the
principle locus regit actum, which for centuries has been a regular feature of the conflict of laws. See Juenger, supra note
11, at 427. It has long been recognized that application of the law of the place of contracting serves the function of
protecting contracts against formal invalidity. See 2 E. RABE., supra note 12, at 489, 517-18; cf. B. Cumz, supra note
29, at 99 n.32. Given the near universal consensus on the appropriateness of that connecting factor (as long as it upholds
agreements) one is struck by its conspicuous absence in the provision of validation Weintraub has drafted. The addition
of a territorial ingredient would have produced a much better choice-of-law rule.
106. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1978).
107. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). See generally, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law: From Shaffer to Allstate, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 837 (1981).
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ingly, there is no need to combine connecting factors until some critical mass108 is
reached.
Now let us look again at the Uniform Commercial Code. At first blush, its
choice-of-law rule appears patently ethnocentric, since it requires application of the
forum's Code provisions to the exclusion of the laws of other states whenever a
transaction has some appropriate relation to the forum. That impression, however, is
misleading, as becomes apparent if one considers the reason for Section 1-105(1). Far
from sanctioning an unthinking forum bias, the drafters meant to assure their work
product the broadest possible scope because of the Code's intrinsic quality.10 9 In this
they could not be altogether wrong, if one considers the success story of the Code's
nationwide adoption. Thus, that important statute enshrines the legislative policy that
a superior law can properly claim a wide scope of application.
If one combines that idea with an appropriately modified version of Section 145
of the Second Restatement, the following alternative reference rule emerges:
In selecting the rule applicable to any issue presented by a multistate products liability
claim, the court will take into account the laws of the following jurisdictions:
(a) The place where the injury occurred,
(b) The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) The place where the product was acquired, and
(d) The home state (habitual residence, place of incorporation and principal place of
business) of the parties.
As to each issue, the court shall select from the laws of these jurisdictions that rule of
decision which most closely accords with modem standards of products liability.
No apology should be needed for drawing on the Second Restatement. Whatever
may be wrong with it, we cannot simply disregard the intellectual effort it represents.
The Uniform Commercial Code has an even stronger claim to our attention, for it is
the positive law in all states but one. Moreover, its warranty provisions't 0 were a first
legislative attempt to deal with strict liability imposed for defective goods. Given the
fact that the United States is a leader in the field of products liability, it also seems
entirely appropriate to consult, first and foremost, American sources elaborated by
such prestigious bodies as the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute. Anyone concerned about whether such a widely fanned
alternative reference rule can also meet worldwide standards would do well to consult
article 1, paragraph 1 of the Hague Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to
108. Compare Cavers, supra note 89, at 723, 725 with Weintraub, supra note 1, at 505.
109. To explain the Code's deviation from conflicts principles prevalent at the time of its adoption the draftsmen
argued that broad application of its provisions "may be justified by its comprehensiveness, by the policy of uniformity,
and by the fact that it is in large part a reformulation and restatement of the law merchant and of the understanding of a
business community which transcends state and even national boundaries." U.C.C. § 1-105 official comment 3 (1978).
See also R. Leflar, supra note 32, at 202; Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances
in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1126 & n. 134 (1956); Katzenbach, Panel Discussion on the
Uniform Commercial Code, 12 Bus. LAw. 49, 72-74 (1956).
110. U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to 2-316 (1978).
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the Form of Testamentary Dispostions. ill If that provision is any indication, a
multiplicity of alternative connecting factors should not be an obstacle to international
acceptability.
Letting the choice of the applicable law hinge on the intrinsic merits of
competing substantive rules seems preferable to relying on either the unilateral
election by one party or the propensity of these rules to hurt or help a particular
litigant. If widely adopted, the proposed alternative reference rule would promote the
values of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result by creating, in effect, a
national consensus law. Dipegage, the process of deciding different issues in the
same case according to different states' law, would lose its horror, for there is nothing
wrong with applying to a multistate case a composite law that integrates rules of
certified superiority. Courts would be able to adjudicate cases such as Paris Air
Crash'1 2 and Agent Orange'13 with greater ease than any other known choice-of-law
approach can possibly assure, and it is of course precisely in complex situations where
a rule or theory must prove its worth. Finally, several states already apply the very
choice-of-law rule principle on which my rule is based. 114
One can, however, anticipate two objections: (1) The forum will invariably
consider its law to be the most progressive, and (2) courts cannot make the value
judgments the proposed rule requires. These objections are related: they proceed from
the assumption that judges lack the ability to question the wisdom of established law.
That this hypothesis is specious should be obvious to anyone who has ever studied
products liability and noticed how it has evolved through the process of judicial
lawmaking. By now, Cardozo's discussion of privity"15 and Traynor's espousal of
strict liability for defective products 1 6 have become part of the repertory of every first
year law student. The opinions of these two eminent jurists did not merely reform the
laws of New York and California but those of the United States, because they
persuaded other judges to scuttle outdated precepts. If courts would indeed uncriti-
cally accept the superiority of home-grown rules and were incapable of making value
judgments, there would be no American law of products liability as we know it.
Whatever arguments can be mustered against the better law principle in general, as
applied to this particular choice-of-law problem, they sound hollow.
111. II Acts and Documents of the 9th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (1960),
reprinted in 9 Am. J. Co'.Ni. L. 701, 705 (1960). Article I, paragraph 1, of the Convention provides as follows:
A testamentary disposition shall be valid as regards form if it complies with the internal law:
a) of the place where the testator made it, or
b) of a nationality possessed by the testator, either at the time when he made the disposition, or at the time of his
death, or
c) of a place in which the testator had his domicile either at the time when he made the disposition, or at the time
of his death, or
d) of the place in which the testator had his habitual residence either at the time when he made the disposition, or
at the time of his death, or
e) so far as immovables are concerned, of the place of their situation.
Id.
112. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 339 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
113. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
114. See Kay, supra note 26, at 565-72, 586.
115. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
116. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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There is a further possible objection to the proposed alternative reference
provision, namely that it will not always be easy to determine which rule most closely
accords with modem products liability standards. That is doubtless true, but hardly
an argument against the underlying principle. The closer the question, the more
helpful it is to obtain a judicial opinion that assesses the quality of different rules and
principles. Surely, a thoughtful evaluation of competing policy considerations is of
greater value to the bench and bar, not to mention law professors, than yet another
flight of fancy into the Cloudcuckooland where renvoi and comparative impairment
dwell. Moreover, when dealing with substantive rules, judges will find themselves on
firmer ground than in wading through the conflicts quagmire. In fact, in most
instances a glance at Prosser's treatise 17 is likely to resolve any doubt about the
merits of a particular rule which may linger in the minds of judges, in spite of the
judiciary's sophistication in the field of products liability. But even if neither their
considerable experience nor diligent research furnishes a ready answer, the judges'
efforts should at least yield a coherent argument that furnishes a starting point of
reasoning for the next case to raise the same issue. In this fashion, hard cases can help
make good law.
VII
Let me now return to that modicum of conflicts consensus I touched upon at the
outset. For all too long, conflicts scholars have engaged in jurisprudential cerebra-
tions without much regard for the consequences of the rules and approaches they have
advocated. There is a widespread belief that the conflicts of laws is different from all
other legal disciplines in that practical results and workability do not matter. If what
my colleagues Sedler and Weintraub say is any indication, this attitude is changing.
At least some of those who would deduce the solution to multistate problems from the
concerns of sovereigns do emphasize the need for sound substantive results in
multistate cases. I welcome this change, for I have long maintained that the conflict
of laws should provide decent and workable solutions to real-life problems. Instead
of being a drag on the coattails of civilization," 8 our discipline can become an engine
of law reform. Fifteen years ago, I suggested that "courts should cut short their
dalliance with theories and methodologies and focus on the narrow, but important,
question whether to accept or reject teleology in tort choice of law.""19
Alas, that heartfelt call was misaddressed. Even before 1969,120 and certainly
since then,' 2' courts have in fact been result-selective. Rarely do they non suit
orphans and cripples; 22 in multistate personal injury cases the current conflicts rule
seems to be that the plaintiff wins, unless counsel is inept. Yet, it may be too much
117. W. PossER, THE LAw oF ToRTs (5th ed. P. Keeton 1984).
118. The term was coined by Cheatham& Reese, Choice ofthe Applicable Law, 52 CoLi. L. REv. 959, 980 (1952),
to describe substantive rules that are outdated and disfavored in making choice-of-law decisions.
119. Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. Rsv. 202, 233 (1969).
120. See id. at 224, 231-32.
121. See Juenger, supra note 5, at 20-23.
122. But see id. at 48.
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to expect courts to cut their dalliance with academic theories and methodologies.
However questionable a particular approach may be, judges are bound to welcome it
as long as it enables them to reach the results they desire. Interest analysis, for reasons
I have stated elsewhere, 123 does the trick. It "works," because it works with mirrors.
It is a gigantic escape device, for judges are able to pull any number of policies and
interests out of a hat if it suits their purposes, even to the point of contorting Currie's
approach so as to favor a foreign law the court considers better than its own. 124
Judicial honesty may be the best policy, 25 but perhaps it is not invariably the wisest.
The proper addressees of my exhortation are therefore not the judges, but you, the
scholars who manufacture the theories and methodologies on which courts rely to do
multistate justice and, sometimes, multistate injustice.
123. See id. at 47-48.
124. See Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
125. Leflar, supra note 65, at 26.
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